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Marketing of Safe Food Through Labeling
Jutta Roosen
After a series of food safety crises during the 1990s, regulators, producers, and retailers alike are trying to regain 
consumer confidence by redesigning legislation and quality-assurance programs. These programs focus on process in-
novation, traceability, and identity preservation of products. This paper reviews current developments in the European 
food and retail industry. Hypotheses on the link between structural adjustments in the food production and marketing 
chain and the provision of safe food emerge. In addition, we report results from a survey on consumer perception of 
food-safety attributes and discuss the opportunities for and limits of marketing safe food through labels. 
by consumers. Therefore, firms that wish to credibly 
communicate the safety of their products must rely 
on third-party accreditation or government enforce-
ment. The direct labeling of food-safety attributes, 
however, has proven difficult. Natural processes, 
governed by stochastic relationships, are involved in 
producing the final product, scientific uncertainties 
exist about cause-effect relationships, and safety 
attributes consequently are variable. Furthermore, 
the labeling of product attributes can be costly if 
expensive tests are necessary to confirm a food’s 
safety characteristics. Responding to these difficul-
ties, firms and regulators have extended their label-
ing and product differentiation efforts to process 
attributes. Examples are the labeling of organic and 
GMO-free food. 
This paper reviews current developments in the 
European food and retail industry. Hypotheses on 
the link between structural adjustments in the food 
production and marketing chain and the provision 
of safe food emerge. In addition, we report results 
of a survey on consumer perception of food safety 
attributes. The paper closes with a discussion of 
the potentials and limits of marketing safe food 
through labels.
Markets for Safe Food
If a food’s risk or safety were perfectly observable 
to consumers, markets for food safety would work 
well. Consumers willing to pay for safer foods 
would express this demand in the marketplace. 
Producers could choose to offer safer and higher-
quality goods as long as it was profitable to do so. 
Markets for safe food, however, tend not to 
work perfectly (Caswell 1998). They fail due to 
information asymmetries and consumers’ difficulty 
in assessing a product’s safety. Furthermore, even 
producers may find quality difficult to assess. Food 
production often involves a number of successive 
A series of food-safety crises has reduced consum-
ers’ confidence in the food system’s ability to de-
liver safe, high-quality food. As a result, regulators, 
producers, and retailers alike are trying to regain 
consumers’ confidence by redesigning legislation 
and quality-assurance programs. These efforts can 
only succeed in restoring consumers’ confidence if 
new standards of process and product attributes are 
successfully communicated. Product labeling is one 
way to accomplish such communication.
Food-safety characteristics can be defined in a 
variety of ways. A narrow definition of food-safety 
attributes focuses on product attributes causing ad-
verse health impacts. A broader definition includes 
all attributes that influence consumers’ perception 
of food safety. In the context of marketing safe 
food, it seems more appropriate to focus on this 
wider definition that comprises all signals informing 
consumers about food safety.
Some quality attributes serve as food-safety 
signals even when there are no strong cause-effect 
relationships between the signaling attribute and the 
resulting product quality. Hence, consumers also 
look for process attributes as signals of product 
quality. Such behavior was observed, for example, 
in the increased demand for organic products after 
the dioxin crisis in Belgium and after the BSE crisis. 
Although the Nitrofen scandal in Germany in 20021 
demonstrated that organic agriculture is not im-
mune to food safety risks, consumers consider 
it less prone to systemic failure.
Labeling food-safety attributes requires some 
particular considerations. Food-safety attributes are 
credence attributes that cannot be directly assessed 
1 In 2002 the carcinogenic pesticide Nitrofen was found in 
organic feed, organic eggs, and organic broiler and organic 
turkey meat in Germany.
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production stages, and information asymmetries 
along the supply chain make it difficult for indi-
vidual producers to assess the quality of inputs 
being used.
A possible market solution to this problem of 
asymmetric information consists of investing in 
product labeling. Brands and labels conveying 
quality information enable the market to provide 
consumers with the level of information they de-
sire, thus transforming credence and experience 
attributes into search attributes. Given the severe 
market disruptions caused by food-safety incidences 
and the increasing interest of food producers and 
retailers in food labeling, regulators have become 
increasingly involved in setting the rules for label-
ing. Indeed, governments need to enforce labeling 
if consumers do not trust privately sponsored labels. 
Intervention may also be required when labeling is 
not in the firm’s interest and when a private solution 
to the signaling problem does not exist. 
Furthermore, governments play a role in as-
suring the quality and truthfulness of information 
transmitted via private labels (Caswell and Moj-
duszka 1996). Regulating information transmitted 
via private certification and labeling programs 
allows governments to circumvent costs associ-
ated with mandatory labeling. Crespi and Marette 
(2001) provide a welfare analysis of food-safety-
certification financing under different forms of 
competition among sellers and certifiers. In the 
case of maintained competition among sellers, a 
voluntary certification funded by a per-user fee 
is efficient. Policy recommendations change in a 
non-trivial way if food producers or certifiers exert 
market power.
Signaling Food-Safety Attributes Via Labeling
Consumers choosing among competing food 
products face difficulties in assessing quality, 
particularly with respect to safety attributes. These 
attributes are not readily assessed by consumers, 
who must rely on expert information. However, 
consumers may use heuristics as quality signals. 
As Dawar and Parker (1992) point out in a literature 
review on quality signaling, these signals include 
brand names (Akerlof 1970; Ross 1988) or brand 
advertising (Milgrom and Roberts 1986), product 
appearance (Nelson 1970), price (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1986), and product or retail reputation 
(Cooper and Ross 1985). 
Signals mostly help consumers who lack ex-
pertise, who need to reduce the risk of an ill-suited 
purchase, or who face difficulties in assessing the 
objective quality. Quality signals can be intrinsic 
(tangible) or extrinsic (intangible) to a product’s 
quality. Intrinsic signals relate directly to the prod-
uct itself. They are important if they concern search 
attributes such as physical appearance. However, 
quality judgment based on post-purchase experience 
and extrinsic signals, such as brand names and retail 
reputation, is more important if product attributes 
are less tangible. When consumers have to rely on 
expert assessment, reputation can only be built by 
third-party involvement, which enforces the cred-
ibility of the quality signal. 
An important heuristic for food quality is the 
product’s origin. Labels designating geographic 
origin establish and protect reputation on behalf of 
a collective of firms. They rely on voluntary par-
ticipation, and in the EU they are strongly protected 
by government regulation (e.g., 2081/92/EC and 
2082/92/EC). Consumers use information about the 
collective of firms to assess the quality of an indi-
vidual firm (Tirole 1996) or to connect the product 
to geographical origins, physical production envi-
ronments, and traditions of agricultural and prod-
uct-transformation practices. Studies have shown 
that regional labels can be important in consumer 
choices (Landon and Smith 1998; Luz Loureiro and 
McCluskey 2000). 
Labeling programs marketing safe food often 
concentrate on communicating the improved 
level of safety. However, firms are also interested 
in assuring homogeneity in quality. Given that 
food-safety attributes are often subject to natural 
variability—e.g., microbial contamination—safety 
attributes may vary to a significant degree. Many 
quality-assurance programs thus attempt to homog-
enize products and to control the production process 
to limit the risk of a future food-safety incidence. 
Developments in Food and Retail Markets
Private Labels in Food Retailing
In recent years the use of private labels in the food-
retailing sector has increased. Private labels devel-
oped by retailers, also called store brands, serve 
different purposes. They may serve to promote the 
store, build customer loyalty, and signal quality 
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Furthermore, the retailing industry increases its 
independence from food manufacturers (Dobson 
1997). Private-label products represent an increas-
ing share of food products sold. In the UK, the share 
has reached 30% of value sold and in France and 
Germany it is 17% and 15%, respectively (Breithor 
et al. 2001). While the first generation of private 
brands was placed within the low-price segment 
and has served a price-promotion strategy, retailers 
have commenced developing private labels in the 
premium segment of food products. An example is 
store brands of organic foods.
A recent survey of European retailers by the 
Private Label Manufacturers Association (PLMA) 
found that retailers continue to develop private-la-
bel products with particular focus on high-quality 
products (Briem 2002). When asked about the fac-
tors currently influencing their private-label policy, 
food safety was named by 53% of the respondents 
and ranked second after customer loyalty (54%). 
In France, food-safety issues were mentioned by 
80% of the interviewees. Three-fourths of the re-
spondents declared that their companies will focus 
on the introduction of high-quality products; one in 
three mentioned the introduction of organic foods 
and non-food items as store-brand products.
Based on case studies of the European food 
industry, Traill and Meulenberg (2002) pose the 
hypothesis that private-label suppliers are mostly 
process-oriented while at the same time they empha-
size the development of new products. Successful 
brand manufacturers, in contrast, are predominately 
product- or market-oriented. Therefore, it does not 
seem surprising that the increasing development of 
private-label products has led to increased efforts in 
quality-assurance and certification schemes. 
Occasional supply relationships impose high 
information costs on firms at the lower end of the 
supply chain. Hence, downstream firms will seek 
closer arrangements with their suppliers to reduce 
these transaction costs. For example, there is a trend 
in the British beef industry to source beef through 
partnership agreements and groups of farmers. As 
argued in Loader and Hobbs (1999), one cause for 
this action by retailers may lie in the asymmetric 
liability hazard in the supply chain that is imposed 
on retailers by the UK Food Safety Act of 1990. By 
becoming more active in the development of their 
private-label products and by increasing the quality 
of these products, retailers can build a reputation 
for quality.
Traceability Systems
Marketing and regulating food safety increasingly 
involves traceability systems, product segregation, 
and identity preservation. Traceability is defined as 
the ability to trace back the components of a particu-
lar product from retailers to suppliers, down to the 
farm level. From a food-safety perspective, a trace-
ability system serves two distinct purposes. First, 
it improves the likelihood of isolating the cause 
of a food-safety incident and facilitates necessary 
intervention and product recalls. Second, it enables 
the identity preservation of individual products; as 
a result, it also may increase the effectiveness of 
liability rules in the regulation of food-safety risks. 
Recently, the European Union passed traceability 
requirements for genetically modified (GM) foods. 
In addition, the EU has enacted mandatory labeling 
of beef to indicate the place of slaughtering, pro-
cessing, and production (1760/2000/EC).
Parallel to mandatory traceability systems, the 
private sector is developing its own quality-as-
surance and traceability systems. For example, a 
German supermarket chain has been developing 
an online traceability program for beef based on 
DNA information. As Golan, Krissoff, and Kuchler 
(2002) point out, the private sector may have some-
what different motivations to implement traceability 
systems. The food sector may want to differentiate 
its products in the market for credence attributes, to 
facilitate the trace-back of food safety and quality 
attributes, and to improve its supply management. 
Producing evidence for the existence of credence 
attributes may require further segregation and iden-
tity preservation. 
Sector-wide Quality Assurance and Certification 
Schemes
Changing food-safety requirements and supply re-
lationships require process innovation. In response 
to food-safety incidences and new food-safety leg-
islation, branded products may adapt more easily 
than generic products because they are largely 
differentiated. They also may more readily show 
compliance with new requirements. It is more dif-
ficult for producers of generic products to assign 
responsibility and to point out that steps have been 
taken to ensure higher safety levels (Loader and 
Hobbs 1999). Thus it may be necessary to develop 
a suitable “brand” image, even for generic products. 80   November 2003 Journal of Food Distribution Research 34(3) Roosen Marketing of Safe Food Through Labeling   81
This may to some extent explain the observed trend 
to higher-quality private-label products.
The farm-to-table approach propagated by gov-
ernments in the U.S. and in Europe is also followed 
by private business. Quality production does not 
only involve signaling to the final consumer but also 
to subsequent processors in the production chain. 
Quality-assurance systems in the food industry 
have developed from generic standards such as 
ISO 9000 and HACCP to systems that are specific 
to the food industry and its subsectors. New national 
and international rules require increased vigilance 
on the traceability and quality of inputs. Examples 
include the Dutch QC standard (Quality Control 
of Feed Ingredients for Animal Feed), the British 
Retail Consortium (BRC) technical standard for 
companies supplying retailer-branded food prod-
ucts, the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), and 
the German Quality and Safety standard (Qualität 
und Sicherheit GmbH, QS).
These systems build on quality-management 
principles developed within the ISO 9000 system 
and the HACCP concept. They involve quality-man-
agement principles in processing and distribution as 
well as good practice for agriculture. Parallel to the 
BRC standard, the German retail sector currently 
is developing an international standard for audit-
ing private-label products. By outsourcing audits to 
third-party certifiers, one hopes to reduce the need 
for and the costs involved in individual audits of 
private-label manufacturers.
The adoption of quality-assurance systems is 
motivated by internal factors, improving the pro-
ductive efficiency within a firm, and by external 
factors that relate to market access. Transaction-
cost reductions drive the adoption process (Hol-
leran, Bredahl, and Zaibet 1999). Tracing products 
and proving due diligence is easier when supplier 
information is readily available. 
To restore consumer confidence in meat prod-
ucts, the German meat sector has created the 
Quality and Safety (QS) label. This label involves 
farm suppliers, individual farms, slaughterhouses, 
meat processors, and retailers. Launched after the 
BSE crisis in 2000/01, QS introduced a system of 
process control and traceability for meat and meat 
products. It requires documentation and consists of 
three layers of control: self-audits, firm audits by 
independent auditors, and accreditation of auditors. 
As of March 2003, 869 companies have enrolled in 
the QS system (QS GmbH 2003).2 
Critics claim that standards within the QS system 
do not go far enough beyond legal requirements. 
The system as such does not lead to a differentiated, 
high-quality product. The recent case of dioxin-
contaminated feed in eastern Germany has shown 
that the QS system leaves gaps in the supply-chain 
management of quality. Although the feed producer 
in Thuringia who was identified as the source of the 
dioxin contamination was not certified under the 
QS system, he delivered feed ingredients to mills 
participating in QS (Handelsblatt 2003). Additional 
problems relate to the fact that the system attempts 
to cover all actors in the meat production chain. 
As a result, vigilance may not be at its best and 
moral-hazard problems prevail, reducing care-tak-
ing efforts of participating firms. Due to its wide 
scope, the differentiation of products does not seem 
possible and, because of free-rider problems, the 
investment in reputation is at risk.
To improve the safety in the overall system it may 
be necessary for some firms to take leadership roles 
and to push for higher safety efforts. Leadership 
on the part of one or several firms may reduce 
market failure in the system (Hennessy, Roosen, 
and Miranowski 2001) and can be fostered by 
regulatory intervention, e.g., liability laws, or by 
active participation of some members of the supply 
chain.
Consumer Attitudes Toward Food-Safety 
Signals
After having reviewed recent trends in the manage-
ment of food safety in the supply chain, questions 
remain regarding the types of signals consumers 
seek in their purchasing decisions. In a survey con-
ducted in spring/summer 2000 in France, Germany, 
and the UK, randomly selected households were 
asked about their food-safety concerns and their 
reliance on quality signals in their beef-purchasing 
decisions. Some results are summarized here; for 
more details, see Roosen, Lusk, and Fox (2003). 
The survey was sent to a random sample of 1,000 
consumers in each of the three countries. The re-
sponse rate was 12%, 7%, and 15%, respectively. 
The survey revealed that concern for food-safety 
2 Among these are 298 feed producers, 95 organizations 
representing about 32,000 farms, 343 slaughterhouses 
representing 243 firms, 207 meat processors, and 26 retailers 
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issues, ranked on a scale from 1 (not important) to 
5 (very important), was generally high. Bacterial 
contamination ranked highest among all issues 
in the UK followed by concern about the use of 
biotechnology. Bacterial contamination was also of 
great concern to consumers in France, but much less 
so in Germany. Use of hormones and biotechnol-
ogy triggered a high degree of consumer concern, 
with both factors among the top three in all three 
countries, particularly in France. Food spoilage 
raised less concern in Germany than in France or 
in the UK. Marbling was more important to German 
consumers, whereas color played a more important 
role for consumers in France and the UK. Price 
received a higher score in the UK than in Germany 
or France.
One portion of the survey focused on how ex-
tensively product labeling is used by consumers 
in their purchasing decisions. One variable asked 
respondents about the importance they place on 
the brand of beef being purchased; a second asked 
about the importance given to its origin. Interest-
ingly, the origin of beef received the highest rating 
of all attributes in both France and Germany, above 
price, marbling, or fat. In the UK, origin received a 
medium score. For consumers in all three countries, 
beef brands were of lesser importance than origin 
labels. 
The results were analyzed using an ordered probit 
model. The probability that brand and origin label 
ranked high was regressed on socio-demographic 
variables and variables measuring food-safety 
concerns. In this analysis, food-safety concerns 
were aggregated into two variables. One variable 
represents concern for food spoilage and bacterial 
contamination; a second variable indicates concern 
about food production methods using pesticides, 
additives, antibiotics, irradiation, hormones, and 
biotechnology. Results suggest that concern about 
biological food-safety hazards does not influence 
the level of importance consumers place on brands; 
however, biological concerns positively influence 
the level of importance consumers place on origin. 
Concern for production technologies was positively 
associated with consumers who view branding and 
origin labeling as very important. Estimates suggest 
that a marginal increase in concern about production 
technology has a larger impact on the perceived 
level of importance of origin labels, as compared 
to branding. 
Discussion
This paper reviewed issues involved in private mar-
keting efforts for safe food, including changes in 
the production and retail environment as well as the 
resulting development of new labeling initiatives. 
Marketing of safe food has become a central issue 
for retail firms and is linked to the development of 
private-label products by retailers. Changing the 
supply relationship between food manufacturers and 
retailers, private labels offer retailers more control 
over production processes and help them increase 
customer loyalty and consumer confidence. 
Sector-specific food-safety-certification schemes 
are being developed to avoid transaction costs due 
to additional audits. The analysis shows, however, 
that if newly developed labels are not accompanied 
by effective sanctions, moral-hazard and safety 
problems may persist. 
Past experience suggests that food-safety issues 
have had an impact on product differentiation and 
label development. How this differentiation impacts 
the competitive structure of the industry remains 
open to future research. Studies on the competitive 
impact of the introduction of quality-differentiated 
private-label products may give some indications 
(e.g., Cotterill, Putsis, and Dhar 2000).
Results of the consumer study show a potential 
for product differentiation with regard to some food-
safety issues. This particularly holds in relation to 
process attributes that consumers perceive as mean-
ingful signals of food safety. As a result, private 
markets may exist for these types of information. 
Other issues cannot be dealt with on a voluntary 
basis. Government action will be required to pro-
tect consumers from false claims and to support the 
credibility of a labeling system. Governments also 
must act to reduce the risk of information overload 
for consumers. Where a multitude of labels and 
claims exists, markets may become too fragmented 
to function efficiently. 
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